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RECENT DECISIONS
INCOME TAX: THE FAMILY TRUST: VAN
ZANDT v. COMMISSIONER (Sth Cir., 1965)
Van Zandt v. Commissioner,' a recent decision handed down
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, raises interesting questions
as to the efficacy of the family trust and lease-back arrangement
as a tax-saving device. In the Van Zandt case the circuit court upheld
a tax court decision 2 which denied the petitioners the right to deduct
from their gross income rental payments made by Dr. Van Zandt for
the use of certain medical buildings and equipment. Dr. Van Zandt
claimed the deductions as "ordinary and necessary expenses ... in
carrying on . . .business." 3 The deductions claimed by Van Zandt

were for payments made to two irrevocable, ten year reversionary
trusts and "contained the minimum requirements under the pertinent
federal statutes which would prevent income of the trusts from
being the income of the donors."'
Van Zandt created the trusts for the benefit of his children
and named himself as trustee. Approximately one month after
creation of the trusts Van Zandt transferred real and personal
property owned and used by him in his medical practice to the
trusts. On the same day the settlor, acting in his capacity as trustee,
executed and delivered to himself "two documents, each styled
lease ...

one covering the premises . . .the other covering certain

...equipment." 5 Thereafter, Van Zandt paid the trust the sums of
$4,800 in 1958, and $6,204.30 in 1959 for rent, repairs and insurance.
Had the Commissioner allowed the deductions, the advantage
to Van Zandt is obvious. His gross income would be reduced by the
amount paid to the trust for rent, repairs, and insurance, and the
income would be shifted, by virtue of the trusts, to beneficiaries in
a lower tax bracket. The Commissioner disallowed the claim on the
1 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 1.L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a). The text of the applicable section of the code
is as follows: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
including, . . . (3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition
to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no
equity."
4 341 F.2d 440, 441 (5th Cir. 1965). See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 671-78.
5 40 T.C. at 828.
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basis that "he continued to use the property in exactly the same
manner as he had before these transactions were arranged . . . this
indicates lack of any business purpose . . ." as is implicitly required

by section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Dr. Van
Zandt contended his claim fell within the provisions of Internal
Revenue Code Sec. 162(a)(3).7 To support this contention Van
Zandt relied on a line of cases beginning with Skemp v. Commissioner8 which have upheld as deductible similar rental payments
in connection with trust and lease-back arrangements. An analysis
of these and other cases may be helpful in evaluating the decision
handed down by the circuit court.
SKEMP CASE

In Skemp a practicing physician transferred a two-story brick
building, in which he was one of the tenants, to an irrevocable trust
created for the benefit of his wife and children.9 Unlike the Van
Zandt trust where the settlor effectively retained some control over
the property by naming himself as trustee,'" the Skemp trust instrument named the La Crosse Trust Company as sole trustee." Skemp
retained no control over the trust except that he could rent "all or
any part of the real estate in this trust at a rental to be determined
by the trustee." 2
In disallowing the rental deduction the Tax Court held that
Skemp did not part with a present interest in the property upon
execution of the trust and lease instruments." Relying on Johnson
v. Commissioner 4 the court held that the rental payments were
gratuitous.
In Johnson the taxpayer borrowed $400,000 from a bank and
gave his wife a check for the same amount. The wife deposited the
check in her account and then transferred these funds in trust to
an independent trustee. One of the provisions in the trust instrument
required the trustee to loan money to her husband upon application
by him for such loan. Five days after creation of the trust the
6

Id. at 831. (Emphasis added.)
7 Supra note 3.
8 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), reversing 8 T.C. 415 (1947) ; Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950), reversing 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); A. T. Felix,
21 T.C. 803 (1954).
9 A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415 (1947).
10 40 T.C. at 825.

8 T.C. at 416.
Id. at 418.
18 Id. at 420.
14 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936).
11
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husband borrowed the $400,000 from the trust at 6% interest. The
court held for the Commissioner and disallowed his claim for a
deduction of $24,000 for interest payments, indicating that "the
question is always whether the transaction under scrutiny is in
reality what it appears to be in form." 15
In the Johnson case Mr. Johnson never lost control of his gift.
Everything he did was a part of the same transaction. Both the
settlor (his wife) and the trustee were under a duty to return his
gift upon his application for a loan."6 In Skemp the Tax Court found
the amount of rent to be paid into the trust by Dr. Skemp was in
reality established by Skemp and not the trustee. The court further
held that, had he chosen to do so, Dr. Skemp could have reserved
a lease with no rent payable. As a result, the rent payments were
held to be gratuities and, like the interest charges in Johnson, were
7
disallowed.1

On appeal the seventh circuit court found that the facts in
Johnson were clearly distinguishable from those in Skemp, and the
decision of the Tax Court was reversed.' In upholding the deduction
for rent the court found that the trust and lease-back arrangement
was a transaction "of substance" whereas the Johnson transaction
was a "formal sham."' 9 The court pointed out that under the trust
arrangement the settlor was legally obligated to pay the monthly
rental sums to the trust and, therefore, the payments were not
gratuities.2 0
HALL CASE

In Hall v. United States2 ' petitioners transferred medical buildings owned by them to an independent trustee for the benefit of their
children. The trust was irrevocable for a ten-year period and thereafter revocable. The instrument also provided that the grantors
might modify or amend the agreement after the ten-year period had
elapsed. It provided, further, that the grantors had the power, during
the minority of the beneficiaries to approve and settle the accounts
of the trustee.
Petitioners relied on Skemp and Brown v. Commissioner22 but
15 Id. at 712.
16 Id. at 712-13.
17 8 T.C. at 421.
18 Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
19 Id. at 600.

Id. at 599.
208 F. Supp. 584 (1962).
180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950), reversing 12 T.C. 1095 (1949). The third circuit
court held rents and royalties paid to two irrevocable trusts created for the benefit
20
21
22
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after admitting the similarity, the court distinguished the cases on the
basis that in Skemp and Brown "the corpus of the trust estate became
the property of beneficiaries upon the termination of the trust, ' 23 and
that the trustee was not in reality an independent trustee, since
"it can hardly be said that a trustee is wholly independent or
has full freedom of action when the grantors had their reversionary
interest and also the right to settle its accounts. 24
In effect, Hall was distinguished from Skemp and Brown on
two grounds: (1) settlors retained a degree of control over the
corpus of the trust and (2) the settlors retained a reversionary
interest in the trust.
BuSINESs PURPOSE TEST

It is interesting to note ,that the Tax Court in Van Zandt
alluded to the independence of the trustee as the determinative
factor in the Skemp and Brown cases. 2" The court did not mention
the reversionary nature of the trust as did the district court in Hall;
instead they proceeded to attack the transaction on the basis that
"where a sale and leaseback does not serve a utilitarian business
the
purpose, but is in reality a camouflaged assignment of income
26
expenses have not been considered ordinary and necessary.;
The Tax Court reasoning found support in the Fifth Circuit,
although the language in the decision of that court is not entirely
clear as to what may or may not be considered an ordinary and
necessary business expense.
In rendering their opinion the court took only two cases into
consideration, the Skemp case, relied on by petitioners and Armston
v. Commissioner,21 relied on by the Government. The circuit court
recognized the similarity of the facts in Skemp and Van Zandt with
the notable exception that the trust term in Skemp was for a twentyyear period and Dr. Skemp retained no reversionary interest in the
trust.2 8 These two factors alone would seem to be enough to put the

Van Zandt case within the ambit of the district court decision in
the Hall case, at least to the extent that the Court in that case disallowed the deduction on the basis of the reversionary interest reof the taxpayer's children were deductible as business expenses where the lease-back
arrangement was voluntarily prearranged by the taxpayer.
23 208 F. Supp. at 588.
24

Ibid.

40 T.C. at 830.
26 Id. at 830.
27 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951), affirming 12 T.C. 539.
28 341 F.2d 440, 441.
25
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tained by the settlors. The circuit court made a further distinction,
however, and pointed out that in Skemp "the property transferred
contained considerably more space than was rented back to the
doctor for his use. Thus, there may have been a proper business
purpose of conveying the property to the trustees for management ....;29
The test adopted by the circuit court appears to be that the
deduction must rest upon a necessary and proper business purpose.
In Van Zandt the court adopted the Government's view that the
deduction was not a necessary business expense. In the language of
the court "the fact remains that there was no real business
purpose served by this intricate transaction. The only thing accomplished was to funnel family income to children in a way that
allowed a reduction to the payor and taxation to the recipient at
reduced rates."3 This reasoning by the circuit court is in conformity
with that of the court in Armston where it was held the sale and
lease-back of heavy equipment, owned and used by a corporation,
to the wife of the principal share-holder of the corporation, must
be disregarded for tax purposes in that "the only logical motive
and purpose of the arrangement under consideration was the creation of rentals, which would form the basis for a substantial tax
reduction...
CONCLUSION

In analyzing the effect of the Van Zandt decision it is difficult to
determine under what conditions a lease back of business property
would result in a permissible deduction of rent as a necessary business expense. In the language of the court "the result ultimately
depends on the factual evaluation of the particular case;" and,
"factors such as the short term of the trust, reversion to the
settlors, predetermination of the right to possession of the property
. . . bears heavily on the element of business purpose. '32 This
language seems to indicate that the standard is arbitrary and implies
that most prearranged transfers and lease-backs will not meet the
business purpose test.
A recent law review article which deals with the problem in3
detail criticizes the position taken by the Tax Court in Van Zandt.1
The author of the article feels "where a grantor gives business
29
30

Ibid.
Ibid.

31 188 F.2d at 533.
32 341 F.2d 440, 444.
33 52 CAIXF. L. REV. 968-77.

